Incentives, Supervision and Regulation of Microfinance Institutions in the developing countries by Founanou, Mathurin & Ratsimalahelo, Zaka
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Incentives, Supervision and Regulation of
Microfinance Institutions in the
developing countries
Mathurin Founanou and Zaka Ratsimalahelo
University Gaston Berger Saint-Louis-Senegal, University of
Franche- Comte
September 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41428/
MPRA Paper No. 41428, posted 19. September 2012 11:34 UTC
Incentives, Supervision and Regulation of Microfinance Institutions in the developing 
countries 
 
 
 
 Mathurin FOUNANOU 1  and Zaka RATSIMALAHELO 2 ∗ 
 
 
1 Université Gaston Berger, Saint-Louis, Sénégal, GERSEG (Groupe d’Etudes et de 
Recherche en Sciences Economiques et Gestion) et CRESE (Centre de Recherche et d’Etudes 
sur les Stratégies Economiques). 
E-mail : mathurin_founanou@hotmail.com 
 
2 Université de Franche-Comté, UFR-Sciences Juridiques, Economiques, Politiques et 
Gestion (SJEPG), CRESE (Centre de Recherche et d’Etudes sur les Stratégies Economiques). 
E-mail : zaka.ratsimalahelo@univ-fcomte.fr 
 
March 2012 
This version September 2012 
 
 
Abstract: We analyze the optimal regulation of a MFI that has private information on the 
intrinsic quality of its loan portfolio (adverse selection) and where the MFI’s choice of effort 
to improve this quality cannot be observed by the regulator (moral hazard). In designing 
optimal contracts the regulator faces a tradeoff between inducing proper incentives for 
efficient MFI and costs of regulation in terms of leaving an informational rent for a high 
quality MFI. We identify conditions for the optimal incentive contract and show that, not 
surprisingly, these contracts depend on the accuracy of the supervisor’s signal, the likelihood 
of facing a high quality MFI, and the cost of supervision. However, since improving the 
accuracy of supervision is costly, even in the optimal monitoring scheme there generally 
exists a positive probability of MFI failure. The content of information disclosure is 
characterized by the optimal monitoring scheme. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Microfinance, i.e. the provision of financial services to the low-income households and micro 
and small enterprises (MSEs), provide an enormous potential to support the economic 
activities of the poor and thus contribute to poverty alleviation.  
Widespread experiences and research have shown the importance of savings and credit 
facilities for the poor and MSEs. This puts emphasis on the sound development of 
microfinance institutions (MFI) as vital ingredients for investment, employment and 
economic growth. In the framework of a financial system approach, adequate regulation and 
supervision of the microfinance industry increasingly move into the centre of attention to 
ensure the safety of the poor’s deposits. The question of the regulation of microfinance is 
frequently raised in recent years and his news is particularly linked to that of 
institutionalization of the IMF, which is often highlighted the gaps or the absence of a 
regulatory framework adapted. A paper recently published in the Microfinance series 
Consensus Guidelines of the CGAP (Guiding Principles on Regulation and Supervision of 
Microfinance (2011) has the merit to the point on the state of reflection, lessons from the 
existing experiences and the degree consensus on the subject, and above all to address the 
issue of supervision, often at the same time left side and yet essential since it refers to the 
means to enforce the regulation. 
Nowadays, microfinance is demonstrating a great expansion specifically in developing 
countries. This expansion in scale and services increases the need for regulation and 
supervision. The concern of the regulatory authority is the security of the people’s deposits 
and the soundness of the financial market. 
Generally, the main justifications of regulatory interventions are market imperfections. 
Concerning the financial market, imperfections are identified by adverse selection and moral 
hazard behaviour as a result of asymmetric information between the parts. Microfinance 
institutions and their activities, as a relatively new part of the financial system, represent a set 
of particular characteristics that enhance the need for regulation and supervision even further. 
Interest in the regulation and supervision of MFIs has arisen from their growth and their 
desire to mobilise deposits. The debate surrounding whether MFIs should be regulated and 
supervised lies in the belief that through regulation, they will become self-sustainable and 
achieve massive outreach. Through regulation, MFIs can also be integrated into the formal 
financial sector. In some developing countries, MFIs have grown to such an extent that the 
failure of one could result in the loss of confidence in the financial sector, thus attracting 
regulatory concern.  
Regulation is defined by Christen, Lyman and Rosenberg (2003) as “the set of binding rules 
governing the conduct of legal entities and individuals, whether they are adopted by a 
legislative body (laws) or an executive body (regulations)”. In addition, the government might 
not be the only possible regulatory institution, denoting with the term also the self-regulation 
of groups of institutions via associations or networks as well (Chavez and Gonzalez-Vega, 
1993). 
Although the terms regulation and supervision are sometimes used interchangeably, 
supervision in contrast, refers to the external oversight aimed at determining and enforcing 
compliance with regulation, Vogel, Gomez and  Fitzgerald (2000). It is implemented through 
examination practices and monitoring mechanisms which determine the real risks faced by the 
financial intermediary. Llewellyn (1986) defines supervision as the process of monitoring that 
institutions are conducting their business either in accordance with regulations or more 
generally in a prudent manner. Therefore, regulation typically refers to the rules that govern 
the behaviour financial institutions whereas supervision is the oversight that takes place to 
ensure that financial institutions comply with those rules. The distinction is important where 
the regulatory and supervisory functions are split between different agencies as they may have 
different policy implications. 
Before starting the analysis of different issues which are taken into account for implementing 
a good regulatory structure, it is important to make a distinction between prudential and non 
prudential regulation. Regulation is prudential when it governs the financial soundness of 
licensed intermediaries businesses, in order to prevent financial system instability and losses 
to small, unsophisticated depositors. Although, this paper focuses on prudential regulation, it 
is important to state that not all regulatory objectives need a prudential treatment.  Indeed, non 
prudential regulatory issues include consumer protection, fraud and financial crime 
prevention, interest rates policies, permission to land, tax and accounting discipline 
(Christern, Lyman and Rosenberg, 2003). Non prudential regulation is an accessory to 
prudential regulation but not less important especially for the Microfinance sector which is 
very sensible to consumer protection and interest rates policies because it deals generally with 
low-income people. Prudential regulation is about the safety and soundness of an institution 
vis-à-vis consumer protection, in that the consumer loses when an institution fails, even if 
there are no systemic consequences. Prudential regulation focuses on the solvency and safety 
and soundness of financial institutions (Llewellyn, 1999). 
When regulation is discussed in relation to MFIs, it is usually in terms of banking type 
regulations, what is termed prudential regulation. Although MFIs have different 
characteristics and risk profiles from traditional formal financial institutions, such as banks, 
deposit-taking MFIs can be likened most closely to banking institutions. 
A current debate in banking regulation centres on the role of information disclosure and the 
optimal degree of prudential supervision, affecting bank’s behaviour and soundness. The 
intuition behind supervision and public disclosure of information about a bank’s riskiness and 
efficiency is that it may induce depositors to monitor its performance more carefully and thus 
providing its management with stronger incentives to engage in less risky activities. 
Previous research on microfinance regulation and prudential supervision focuses on the 
relationship between financial performance and regulation, treating outreach as a secondary 
concern (see Cull, Demirgüç-kunt, and Morduch (2009b)). Ndambu (2011). They have 
analyzed the impact of regulation on financial intermediaries (including MFIs) worldwide, 
deriving potential implications of microfinance supervision in a consistent manner and 
moving one step beyond countries’ anecdotal evidence. Hartarska (2005) finds that regulated 
microfinance institutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States 
have lower return on assets relative to others, and weak evidence that the breadth of outreach 
may be related to regulation. After controlling for the endogeneity of regulation, Hartarska 
and Nadolnyak (2007) have conducted a research using a positive approach to assess if 
regulated MFIs achieve better sustainability and outreach than unregulated MFIs. They find 
that regulation has no impact on financial performance and weak evidence that regulated 
microfinance institutions serve less poor borrowers. As a policy implication, they concluded 
that MFIs’ transformation into regulated financial intermediaries might not lead to improved 
financial results and outreach. However, they fund institutions collecting savings reaching 
more borrowers, thus suggesting that regulation might have an indirect benefit if it is the only 
way allowing MFIs to collect deposits from the public 
In this paper, we analyze the role of prudential supervision and information disclosure as a 
regulatory instrument, and its effects on the MFI’s performance concerning incentives and 
effort. Here, information disclosure refers to the optimal monitoring scheme by the 
supervising agency taking into account all costs and benefits of such a scheme. 
The theoretical literature on banking (see Freixas and Rochet, 1998, for an excellent survey) 
has focused on the role of banks as delegated monitors (e.g. Diamond, 1984), and as 
institutions responsible for extracting information from firms. This role of banks as 
intermediaries helps alleviate some of the agency and informational failures in the capital 
markets. However, such intermediation is not without costs, and introduces its own set of 
moral hazard and other agency problems requiring some sort of external monitoring or 
supervision (see Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999, for an excellent survey). Our analysis sets out 
from the viewpoint that small depositors and investors need to be protected and represented 
by a banking regulator. We consider a regulator-bank/MFI two-layer hierarchy as a stylized 
model of a regulated microfinance sector, where the regulator may require the help of a 
supervising agency to collect information. Finally this paper is also related to the model 
heavily builds on Kofman and Lawarrée (1993), Laffont and Tirole (1993), and Giammarino, 
Lewis and Sappington (1993). 
This paper deals with both the imperfection monitoring problem and incentive effects by 
explicitly modelling profit-maximizing behaviour by MFI who have better information about 
their environment and their activities than do regulators. Our study extends Giammarino, 
Lewis and Sappinton’s focus on incentive compatibility requirements by analyzing the 
regulator’s concern for social welfare. In Giammarino, Lewis and Sappington (1993) the bank 
retains its own profits, and the regulator is modelled as presenting a menu of options to the 
bank, these options linked to the required capital structure depending on the bank’type. Our 
designed incentive contracts are so to say the monetary equivalents of these options. Here, the 
regulator faces a trade-off between stronger incentives and the increased probability of bank 
failure (see Cordella and Yeyati, 1998, for a first exploratory analysis on public disclosure 
and banks’ risk exposure). However, it seems that there is a widely held consensus among 
supervisory authorities on the importance of publicly disclosing bank information. 
In contrast to Giammarino, Lewis and Sappington (1993), we assume no initial equity. This 
difference allows our model to capture the specific feature of the microfinance institutions in 
developing countries where MFI often lack resources. Another particularity and most 
important, in the model is that we introduce the government investment. We have proved that 
supervisor may help the regulator in reducing the informational asymmetry, and consequently 
leading to smaller distortions of effort and lower informational rents. Our analysis here of the 
optimal contracts specifies monetary transfers from the regulator to the MFI  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we specify the model and characterize the 
optimal contract with full information. In Section 3, we derive the optimal contract with 
supervision and without supervision. Section 4 presents a numerical example to illustrate the 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. THE MODEL AND BENCHMARK SOLUTIONS 
 
2.1. Central Elements of the Model.  
In our model, we consider both adverse selection and moral hazard. The MFI attracts 
deposits at a fixed interest and invests these in projects promising a random return, depending 
on the overall quality of the MFI’s loan portfolio. The MFI is able to enhance this overall 
quality of its loan portfolio by exerting costly effort. The regulator does not know the MFI’s 
exact type in terms of the exogenously given intrinsic quality nor observes its effort. 
 
2.1.1. The MFI  
 
At the beginning of the period 0=t  initial deposits 0 0D ≥  and donors and/or government 
investment I are used to finance loans 0L , that is 0 0L D I= + . It is throughout assumed that the 
MFI owns no equity. The MFI offers a standard debt contract that pays r per unit of deposit at 
maturity at 1=t . Deposits are not insured and pay zero before maturity. We denote by )( 0LC , 
an increasing, strictly convex function, the cost of processing 0L  of risky loans. Hence the net 
return on risky loans is )( 00 LCRL − , where is the average rate of return of all projects 
financed by the MFI. 
We assume that each borrower has access to an investment project. The borrower is unable to 
finance the project alone and thus requires an outside source of funding. For simplificity, we 
assume that MFIs are the only source of funds. Although each investment project requires the 
same amount of funding from the MFI, projects differ in their expected returns. The average 
rate of return R on all projects financed by the MFI is random, but its distribution depends on 
the overall quality q  of the loan portfolio. More precise, higher levels of q  shift the 
distribution of returns in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD), that is, reduce 
the likelihood of low returns. Formally, R is the realization of a random variable that is 
distributed with cumulative density function )/( qRF and a continuous and differentiable 
density )/( qRf over the support [ ]RR, .  
The overall quality of the MFI’s loan portfolio consists of an exogenous and endogenous part. 
For simplicity, we assume that eqq += 0 , where 0q denotes exogenous quality and e denotes 
effort exerted by the MFI’s management. Exogenous quality 0q can take only two values, 
lq0 and
hq0 , with 0000 >−=∆
lh qqq , where lq0  obtains with probability v  and 
hq0 with 
probability v−1 . Hence, this defines two types of MFI: the high quality MFI and the low 
quality MFI. Following Giammarino, Lewis and Sappington (1993), the exogenous (intrinsic) 
quality captures all factors that beyond the bank’s control, such as prevailing economic 
conditions or relevant characteristics of its customers. The bank/MFI is able to raise its overall 
quality q by exerting managerial effort e which decreases the marginal cost for a disutility 
)(eψ ( 0,0,0 ≥′′′>′′>′ ψψψ ). 
The crucial information asymmetry in this model concerns that neither the exact type of the 
bank/MFI 0q nor the exerted effort e is observable to the regulator, but only known to the 
bank/MFI. However, overall quality q and realized gross profits are publicly observable and 
verifiable1. 
We assume that the regulator is benevolent and wishes to maximize social welfare.  For so 
doing he can use transfers to the firm, say t . These transfers are raised with distortive taxes 
which create a social cost .0>λ  
The expected gross profit on its loan portfolio of a quality- i MFI as a function of effort is 
given by: 
0 0 0( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( / )
R
i
R
e RL C L r L f R q dRpi = − −∫ ,     (1) 
 
Note that negative gross profits induce default since it is assumed that the MFI has no own 
equity. The probability of MFI failure as a function of effort is given by: 
 
∫=
R
R
i
i dRqqRfep ))(/()( 0 ,       (2) 
 
                                                 
1
 This assumption is quite consistent with bank regulation practice of periodic inspections of bank assets and 
operations (see also Giammarino, Lewis and Sappington, 1993). 
It follows that a high quality MFI needs to exert less effort than a low quality MFI to avoid 
MFI failure. That is given, )()( epep hl ≥ for all 0≥e . 
 
Finally, realized profits at period t = 1 directly accrue to the regulator. In return the MFI is 
compensated for its effort by mean of a monetary transfer t . The MFI’s expected utility MFIU  
amounts to 
( ) [ ]MFI i iU t e E Pψ= − −  
 
where P denotes the possible punishment imposed on the MFI’s management by the regulator, 
whenever suspected of shirking. However, the penalty imposed cannot exceed the net transfer, 
reflecting the limited liability of the MFI’s management. That is, we impose tP ≤ . 
 
 
2.1.2. The supervisor 
In our regulatory game the supervising agency has the ability to detect false reports of the 
MFI’s management. In this sense it may prevent the MFI from shirking since the MFI faces a 
penalty if caught lying. Consequently, the costs of regulation may drop and better incentives 
for low quality MFI may result. Obviously much depend on the supervisor’s accuracy to 
detect shirking behaviour. Moreover, it is assumed that the regulator is unable to perform the 
supervisory task itself. This could well be the case because supervision comprises of complex 
monitoring and auditing activities which require specific skills. Like the regulator the 
supervisor is uninformed about the MFI’s true type q , but receives a signal σ  which is 
imperfectly correlated with the MFI’s exerted effort. This imperfect correlation reflects that a 
supervising agency probably has no access to all relevant material concerning the MFI’s 
performance; it is only able to examine a sample of the MFI’s files and records on which it 
bases its report to the regulator. It is assumed that the bank also observes the signal σ : the 
MFI knows which records and files were examined. The supervisor is assumed to always 
report truthfully.  
The supervisor reports a signal σ , { , }qσ ∈ ∅  the regulator. The supervisor observes 
0q=σ with probability ξ and nothing with probability ξ−1 . 
So, ,)Pr( 0 ξσ == q and ξσ −=∅= 1)Pr( . The presence of the supervisor tilts the regulatory 
contract towards higher-powered incentives. This probability ξ reflects the signal’s precision 
or accuracy. The supervisor may improve its accuracy, but only by incurring costs. It is 
assumed that these costs are increasing and convex inξ , we model 
2
)(
2ξξ =sC .        (3) 
These costs may arise from direct and indirect sources. Directly, improving monitoring and 
auditing may require more human resources devoted to these tasks. Indirectly, when more 
accurate disclosed information triggers public concern if it reveals ‘bad news’ in the sense 
that it indicates a shirking MFI’s management. 
 
2.1.3. The Regulator’s Problem 
The role of the regulator is to maximize social welfare. It captures all profits from the MFI 
and designs the contract which it offers to the MFI’s management to compensate for the 
exerted effort. The contract specifies a monetary transfer t  from the regulator to the MFI, to 
which the regulator is irrevocably committed to pay just after the returns on the loans 
materialize at t = 1. More important is the informational restriction that although the regulator 
can in facts verify the overall quality q  of the loan portfolio, it cannot discern between its 
individual components, effort e  and type iq . The cost function ( )eψ  and the functional 
relation between overall quality and effort, i.e. 0q q e= + , are common knowledge. The 
informational asymmetry implies that no written contract can be contingent on effort directly, 
but instead must be geared to observable realized overall quality. 
Social welfare in our model reflects expected MFI profits minus the costs generated by 
financial distress and costs of supervising. The costs of financial distress are given by the 
expected negative pay-offs during bankruptcy plus the social costs of financial distress which 
are assumed to be proportional to these losses. (A similar formulation is given by 
Giammarino, Lewis and Sappington,1993). That is, for  i = l, h, 
 
dRqqRfqrLqLCRLbec
R
R
i ))(/()]())(([)1()( 000000 −−+= ∫ ,  0>b    (4) 
Let q be the level of overall quality which brings to consumers a utility )(qS , 0,0 <′′>′ SS . 
The cost of government involvement in the regulation and supervision of MFI’s is captured 
by the assumption that the social cost of public funds used to finance the insurance program 
is 1)1( >+ λ . 
The regulator maximizes expected social welfareW , where: 
 
[(1 )( ( ) ( )) ]sW E S q c t C Pλ pi= + − + + − +        (5) 
 
We assume that the benevolent regulator is utilitarian. The writing of (5) emphasizes the fact 
that giving up a rent pi to the bank/MFI is socially costly because it requires funding with 
taxes which create a deadweight loss. 
 
Timing of events 
The timing of the regulatory game is now as follows: 
At t = 0: 
- The MFI finance the investment project 0 0L D I= + . 
 - Nature chooses the MFI’s type q . The MFI learns its type. 
- The regulator offers a contract specifying a transfer ( , )t q σ  to the MFI as a function  
of the observed overall quality and the reported signal; the probability ξ of the signal  
qσ = , the reimbursement of costs ( )SC ξ  to the supervisor, and the punishment P  for  
the management. 
- The regulator, the supervisor and the MFI sign the contract. The MFI chooses effort 
e  which determines overall quality q . 
 - If sent by the regulator, the supervisor retrieves the signal σ . 
 
At t = 1: 
 - Return on the loan portfolio materializes and transfers t  are realized; the MFI pays  
r to depositors if 0 0 0( )RL C L rL− > , otherwise it goes bankrupt and the regulator  
ceases its residual income. 
 
2.2. The benchmark solution 
We first introduce a benchmark model, where there are no informational asymmetries. It 
serves two purposes. On the one hand, it constitutes the foundation of the more general 
model. One the other hand, it allows to assess the role of supervisor. In this case the regulator 
is able to observe and verify the exact MFI’s type and its effort, so he. maximizes 
 
, , ,
max [(1 )( ( ) ( ( ) )) ( )] (1 )[(1 )( ( ) ( ( ) )) ( )]
l h l h
l l l l l h h h h h
e e t t
v S q c e t e v S q c e t eλ pi λ pi+ − + + + − + − + +  (6) 
subject to 
 
( )l lt eψ≥   
and  
( )h ht eψ≥           (7) 
 
 
The inequalities (7) describe the individual rationality constraints for both types of 
banks/MFI. These constraints state that the bank need at least be compensated for the cost of 
its exerted effort. The benchmark solution is the policy that the regulator would implement if 
he shared the MFI’s private information about the intrinsic quality level. Maximizing social 
welfare under participation constraint leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. The optimal contract under symmetric information is characterized by: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )i i i ie S e c eψ ∗ ∗ ∗′ ′ ′= −   hli ,=       (8) 
The corresponding transfers are given by: 
 ( )i it eψ∗ ∗= ,  hli ,=         (9) 
 
Proposition 1 state that at the first-best level of effort marginal gains of effort and marginal 
costs of effort are equated. Higher effort induces higher expected profits and lowers the 
probability of MFI failure, but increases the disutility of effort and therefore the required 
transfer for the MFI.  
The regulator pays the MFI just enough to make it accept the contract. That is, the individual 
rationality constraints are binding for types of MFIs. In essence, without adverse selection, the 
moral hazard problem is solved by making the MFI for its own actions. Then, obviously, the 
bank chooses the right effort. The probability of MFI failure is zero ip  ,i l h=  whatever the 
type of the MFI. 
 
3. THE OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRAT WITH INFORMATIONAL 
ASYMMETRY 
 
In this case, it is assumed that the regulator faces adverse selection and moral hazard. In 
designing the contract, the regulator cannot condition on effort directly, so transfers have to 
be made a function of total realized quality q  of the MFI’s loan portfolio. Here, the regulator 
faces adverse selection and moral hazard. In general, adverse selection allows the high type to 
enjoy a positive informational rent from its interaction with the regulator, since it can always 
claim to be of low type, thereby economizing on costly effort. Hence, regulation becomes 
costly.  
  
3.1. The Optimal incentive contract without supervision  
 
Now, the regulator maximizes 
 
, , ,
max [(1 )( ( ) ( ( ) )) ( )] (1 )[(1 )( ( ) ( ( ) )) ( )]
l h l h
l l l l l h h h h h
e e t t
v S q C e t e v S q C e t eλ pi λ pi+ − + + + − + − + +  (10) 
 
subject to 
 
( )l lt eψ≥   
and  
( )h ht eψ≥          (11) 
 
)()( 0qetet hhll ∆+−≥− ψψ  and )()( 0qetet llhh ∆−−≥− ψψ   (12) 
 
Inequalities (12) describe the incentive compatibility constraints. These constraints amount to 
saying that the contract designed for the high (low) quality MFI is the one preferred by the 
high (low) quality MFI. Incentive compatibility induce self selection. In essence, by choosing 
its preferred contract the bank reveals its type to the regulator. Using the Revelation Principle 
we may restrict ourselves to so-called direct revelation mechanisms which have to fulfil the 
incentive compatibility constraints. 
Let )()()( 0qeee ∆−−= ψψφ . It is an increasing convex function from our previous 
assumptions. The incentive constraints can be rewritten: 
 
)()()( hhhll eee φpipi +≥        (13) 
 
)()()( 0qeee lllhh ∆+−≥ φpipi       (14) 
 
Optimal regulation is then obtained by maximizing expected social welfare under the 
incentive and participation constraints. It is well known (see Laffont and Tirole, 1986) or 
Laffont and Martimort, 2002) that, in such a program, the participation constraint of the low- 
effort bank/MFI ( 0)( ≥ll epi ) and the incentive constraint of the high-effort bank/MFI (14) are 
the binding ones. The next proposition reports how the information asymmetry and the social 
cost of government financing combine to induce departures from the first-best solution. 
 
Proposition 2. The optimal contract under asymmetric information without supervision is 
characterized by: 
 
 
(1 )( ( ) ( )) (1 )(1 ) ( )( ) l l l ll
v S e c e v e
e
v
λ λ φψ λ
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
∗∗
′ ′ ′+ − − − +
′ =     (15) 
and  
 λ
λψ )()1()()(
∗∗∗∗
∗∗
′+−′
=′
hhh
h
eceS
e        (16) 
The corresponding transfers are given by: 
 ( )l lt eψ∗∗ ∗∗=           (17) 
and   
 ( ) ( )h h lt e eψ φ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗= +          (18) 
 
Proposition 2 shows a familiar result in incentive theory (Laffont and Tirole, 1986, 1993). 
Under asymmetric information the high type obtains a positive informational rent, while the 
low type’s effort level obtains no rent. In this case the individual rationality constraint of the 
low quality MFI and the incentive compatibility constraint of the high quality MFI are 
binding. From (16), we see that for the high quality MFI we obtain the same effort level as 
under complete information (see equation (8)), from (18) the rent of high type is given 
by )( ∗∗leφ . On the contrary from (15) and (17), we see that the effort level of low quality MFI 
is distorted downwards, and obtains no rent. 
The intuition for the distortion in (15) is then clear. The ability of the high quality MFI to 
mimic the low type (due to the existence of asymmetric information) forcing the regulator to 
leave a rent if it wishes to have an active low quality bank/MFI. However, such a rent is 
socially costly because of the social cost of public funds. 
 
3.2. The Optimal incentive contract with supervision  
 
Let us continue to assume that the government is benevolent but that it uses a supervising 
agency to attempt to bridge its information gap. More specifically, employing a supervising 
agency enables the government to reduce the costs of regulation which are caused by leaving 
the high quality MFI an informational rent. Reducing this informational rent consequently 
leads to a smaller distortion in the effort level of the low quality MFI, which in turn reduces 
the probability of MFI failure. The regulator obtains a truthful report from the supervisor who 
is able to retrieve a signal about the MFI’s exerted effort. The presence of the supervisor tilts 
the regulatory contract towards higher-powered incentives. Intuitively, when ∅=σ , the 
regulator believes that the MFI is efficient with a lower probability, he fears less giving up an 
information rent, affords a higher level of effort which increases the rent. Assume that the 
supervisor observes a signal σ in{ }∅,0q . This signal σ is not perfect, but its accuracy can be 
improved at certain costs, )(ξsC , ξ being the probability of finding out the MFI’s true type. If 
the supervisor indicates that the MFI’s management has shirked, the regulator can impose a 
punishment to correct this undesired behaviour. Because of the possibility that new valuable 
information is retrieved with probabilityξ , the incentive compatibility constraint must be 
modified. 
 
))()(1())(()( 00 qetPqetet llllhh ∆−−−+−∆−−≥− ψξψξψ   (19) 
 
Obviously, since the supervisor cannot collude with the credit cooperative, the optimal 
punishment is the maximal one, that is, tP = .  Moreover there is no use in supervising when 
observing a high overall quality. In equilibrium, high overall quality reflects high effort under 
incentive compatibility2. Givenξ , the maximizing problem becomes: 
 
, , ,
max [(1 )( ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )]
(1 )[(1 )( ( ) ( ( ) )) ( )]
l h l h
l l l s l l
e e t t
h h h h h
v S q c e t C e
v S q c e t e
λ ξ pi
λ pi
+ − + + +
+ − + − + +
    (20) 
 
subject to 
 
( )l lt eψ≥           21) 
   
                                                 
.
2
 This article abstracts from the possibility of sending the supervisor on a random basis when 
observing low overall quality; see Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) on this topic. 
)())()(1()( 00 qeqetet lllhh ∆−−∆−−−≥− ξψψξψ    (22) 
 
A solution of this problem is giving in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. The optimal incentive contract with supervision is characterized by: 
(1 )( ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )( ( )) (1 )
l l l
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v S q c e v e
e
v v
λ φψ ξ λ ξ
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∗∗∗
′ ′ ′+ − + −
′ =
+ −
   (23) 
and 
 
(1 )( ( ) ( ))( ) h h hh
S e c e
e
λψ λ
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
∗∗∗
′ ′+ −
′ =       (24) 
The corresponding transfers are given by: 
 
( ) ( ( ))l lt eξ ψ ξ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗=         (25) 
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ( ))h h l lt e e eξ ψ φ ξ ξ ψ ξ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗= + −      (26) 
 
From Proposition 3 it immediately follows that the effort level is increasing in the 
probabilityξ . Hence, as the accuracy of supervision improves, the distortion of the effort 
becomes smaller. 
 
4. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
 
The distribution of the average rate of return R on all projects financed by the MFI depends 
on the overall quality q  of the loan portfolio. More precise, higher levels of q  shift the 
distribution of returns in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, that is, reduce the 
likelihood of low returns. Here, we model that the mean return on the loan portfolio is 
increasing in the overall quality, but its standard deviation remains constant. Formally, we 
assume that R is uniformly distributed on the interval[ , ]
2 2
q qµ µ− + , implying probability 
distribution 1( / )
2
R qF R q
µ
−
= +  and density 1( / )f R q
µ
= . 
Note that the density is independent from q  and observe that conditional expectation and 
standard deviation are given, respectively, by ( / )E R q q=  and ( / )
12
R q µσ = . 
The expected gross profits on of a quality- i MFI as a function of effort is given by: 
0
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which leads to: 
 
2
0 0
1( )
2 2
i
i e q e r L
µ
pi
µ
  
= + + −  
  
 for 0( ) 2
ie r q µ< − + .   (28) 
and 
( )0 0 0 0( ) ( )ii e q e L C L rLpi  = + − −  ,  for 0( ) 2ie r q
µ≥ − + .   (29) 
 
To ensure non-negative returns on the loan portfolio for all effort levels in both states, we 
restrict [0,2 ]qµ ∈ . The probability of MFI failure as a function of effort is given by: 
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The costs of financial distress )(eci  is defined by : 
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2
(1 )( ) ( )
i
r
i
r q e
b
c e RL C L rL dR
µµ  
+ − 
 
+
= − −∫ ,     (31) 
 
We assume that the MFI management’s disutility is given by 
2
)(
2e
e =ψ , 0≥e .  
Let be the parameter values 5.0=v ; 10 =
lq ; 5.10 =hq ; 1.1=r ; 2=b ; 0 1L =  and 0,20λ = . 
We normalize the net return on risky loans to unity, that is 1R C− = . 
 
The optimal contract under symmetric information (benchmark) is characterized by: 
Benchmark case. 
1le =       1he =  
0,5lt =      0,5ht =  
0lp =       0hp =  
   0,613W =  
 
No MFI receives any rent; whatever its type, the regulator pays the MFI just enough to make 
it sign the contract (i;e. ( )i it eψ= , ,i l h= ). The probability of MFI failure is zero. 
 
Contract without supervision 
0,625le =      1he =  
0,195lt =      0,687ht =  
0,06lp =      0hp =  
   0,519W =  
 
MFI high type has a positive rent (0,625) (1) 0,187htφ ψ= − = . MFI low type ( 1)le <  obtains 
no rent, i.e. ( ).l lt eψ= . The probability of MFI failure is still zero for the high type, but rises 
for the low type. Obviously, the regulator’s expected utility is lower than in benchmark case. 
Thus, in conclusion, when facing adverse selection the costs of regulation increases and that 
the optimal response for the regulator is to shift from a high-powered contract to contract with 
lower power. As a consequence, informational asymmetries increase the instability of the MFI 
sector since 0.lp >  
 
Contract with supervision  
 0, 23ξ =  
0,685le =      1he =  
0, 235lt =      0,663ht =  
0,012lp =      0hp =  
   0,530W =  
 
By comparing the results to the case without supervision, the low type is provided with better 
incentives (0,685>0,625), while the rent for the high type is lower (0,663<0,687). Hence, by 
using a supervising agency the regulator can afford a higher powered contract. The 
probability of MFI failure for the low quality bank drops to 0,012. This result shows that even 
in the optimal monitoring scheme there still exists a positive probability of MFI. Full 
information disclosure need not be optimal for the regulator. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we introduced a framework for designing and analyzing the properties of the 
optimal regulation of a single microfinance institution that has private information on the 
intrinsic quality of its loan portfolio (adverse selection) and where the MFI’s choice of effort 
to improve this quality cannot be observed by the regulator (moral hazard).  
In designing the contract the regulator faces a trade off between inducing proper incentives 
and the costs of regulation as a consequence of informational asymmetries. This may create a 
demand for information gathering. If observed overall quality is low the regulator may decide 
to use a supervising agency. The supervisor collects information and retrieves a signal about 
the MFI’s intrinsic quality, however not with perfect certainty. By incurring costs, the 
supervisor is able to punish the MFI’s management if caught lying. In designing optimal 
contracts the regulator trades off incentives for efficient MFI against costs of regulation. 
The paper provides useful information for guiding microfinance reforms in developing 
countries. By extending Giammarino, Lewis, and Sappington’s (1993) model to the 
microfinance market with supervision and government investment we have proved that 
supervisor may help the regulator in reducing the informational asymmetry, and consequently 
leading to smaller distortions of effort and lower informational rents. Our analysis here of the 
optimal contracts specifies monetary transfers from the regulator to the MFI. These monetary 
transfers are not commonly observed in practice. The paper shows that weak legal and 
regulatory frameworks do not need to be a binding constraint for effective supervision. 
Policies promoting private incentives and market-discipline can overcome some of these 
deficits. In the first-best solution, the regulator is able to observe and verify the exact MFI’s 
type and its exerted effort. Supervision costs are normalized at zero. Supervision and 
disclosure play no role in this setting. We then turn to the optimal incentive contract with 
informational asymmetry but no supervision agency available. Finally, the optimal incentive 
contract is characterized where supervision does play an active role. We study the balance 
between proper incentives, costs of regulation, probability of bank failure, and costs of active 
supervision. The content of information disclosure is characterized by the optimal monitoring 
scheme. 
Our study abstracts form several factors that could be included in future research. First, 
although the interaction between regulator and MFI is not repeated, qualitative conclusions 
will continue to hold in many settings with repeated play. Second, we characterize 
information disclosure by the optimal monitoring scheme. However, the decision whether or 
not to bring out the information found by the supervisor to the public is not really modelled. 
The optimal regulation policies in these situations merit further investigation. 
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